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Abstract 
This essay is a comparative study the role of class actors in Kenya’s independence 
movement and democratic transition in 2002. The concept of social class in an 
African context is explored in order to develop Berins Collier’s theory of working 
class and elite actors in democratic transition. What roles the actors played, their 
motivations and arena of action are analysed in both transitions. The two 
transitions are then compared in order to find similarities and differences between 
them. 
The second part of this essay discusses how the role of the actors has influence 
the course of action taken by the Kenyan state with regards to redress for those 
who suffered during the colonial regime and single-party authoritarian regime 
respectively.  
The findings are that both the path to independence and the democratic 
transition can be characterised as elite dominated transitions were the main actors 
enjoyed a position of prior inclusion in the authoritarian regime. Consequently, 
redress and land reform has not been carried out. 
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1 Introduction 
In the elections in 2002 in Kenya, Kenya African National Union (KANU) and 
former President Daniel Arap Moi were voted out of office by the Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC), an alliance between opposition parties. As President Moi had 
been in power since 1975, many Kenyans viewed this transition as the start of real 
democratic progress, even though Kenya has been a formal multi-party state since 
1992. The election in 1992 and 1997 were far from free and fair and shroud with 
violence according to Kenya Domestic Observation Programme (K-DOP), who 
monitor Kenyan elections (When Kenyans Spoke 2002:10). It could be argued 
that Kenya after 1992 and prior to 2002 can be defined as a limited multi-party 
system where competitive elections were not free or fair. According to Hadenius 
and Teorell limited multi-party systems are the most likely system to make 
progress towards democracy (2007:147). The recent development in Kenya 
coheres with this theory. 
Even though Kenya is making progress towards democracy, few would label 
Kenya a fully democratic state, even using the most basic definition of liberal 
democracy. When analysing the current state of affairs using Robert Dahl’s five 
demanding criteria for democracy (2000:37f), it is clear that Kenya fails to meet 
some of them. In particular the citizens have insufficient possibilities to acquire an 
enlightened understanding, as there are informal restrictions on the media. As a 
journalist I spoke to in 2006 put it: “During Moi´s rule you would be put in jail 
and tortured for writing the wrong thing. Now they just turn to the owners of the 
paper, who makes sure that your career as a journalist is over”.  According to 
Freedom House, the Kenyan press is partly free, harassment of journalists by the 
government still takes place (www.freedomhouse.org). Despite these 
shortcomings it is clear that the 2002 elections and the events that followed are 
marked attempts at consolidating democracy in Kenya. Recent political events 
point toward regression of the state of democracy. The ruling coalition has split 
into several fractions along ethnic lines, and the rapid progress of democratic 
reform, which was promised during the election campaign in 2002, has not taken 
place (Steeves 2006). A clear example of this is that a new constitution granting 
more power to the parliament, which the NARC coalition promoted in 2002 has 
not taken place. This signifies that President Mwai Kibaki has aspirations to 
maintain the Office of the President in a strong position of power.  With national 
elections in December of 2007 there will be further evidence as to whether Kenya 
will revert to authoritarian rule or move towards consolidation.       
During Daniel Arap Moi's rule many people were tortured, imprisoned and 
deprived of resources such as land, education and health care. Furthermore, 
grievances from the past, during colonial rule and the years that followed were 
seldom addressed. An example of this is that the history of the Mau Mau 
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insurgence in the 1950ties when an estimated 100 000-300 000 people were killed 
in British detention camps is not part of the curriculum in Kenyan schools, nor 
have the victims of violence been compensated (Elkins 2005:366f). Structures of 
power put in place during the colonial era still play an important role in Kenyan 
politics. Many of those who gained political power or possession of land through 
violence or collaboration with the British still hold power today. 
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
The aim of this essay is to determine to what extent the path to independence and 
the ongoing democratic transition in Kenya can be categorised as elite oriented 
processes. I will compare these historical cases of transition and determine what 
the implications of this have been on land reform policies and policies to grant 
redress for those who suffered of the Kenyan government.  
My hypothesis is that both Kenyan transitions can be characterised as elite 
transitions, and that this has not encouraged redistribution of land and wealth or 
redress for human rights violations.  
It seems conceivable that policies aimed at countering inequality and granting 
redress to those wronged during the previous authoritarian rule could be a step 
towards consolidating democracy in Kenya. There are two dimensions to this 
study; how the democratic transition in 2002 and independence in 1964 were 
achieved and to some extent what the content of those transitions are. 
A secondary goal of this study is to develop Ruth Berins Collier’s theory of 
class actors in democratic transitions to better suit the state of affairs in an African 
context. 
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1.2 Theory 
The theoretical framework for this essay draws on Ruth Berins Collier’s three 
dimensions in the democratisation process these are: class, prior inclusion and 
arena of action. With regard to class the primary motive is to conceptualise social 
class in an African context and to develop categories, which fit the societal 
structure in Africa. The arena of action indicates where and how the actors 
promote or obstruct democratisation; are they part of negations or do they partake 
in public displays such as rallies. Prior inclusion refers to the actors position in the 
former authoritarian regime; if have access to power, or whether they were 
exploited (Barins Collier 1999:19).  
Analysing the Kenyan case from this set of premises provides insight into how 
class actors behave and provides a framework for the analysis. Applying Eva 
Bellin’s theory of political economy will provide answers to why working class 
and elite actors proceed in a certain manner. Her theory is based on the 
assumption that democracy derives from political struggle, it is not evolutionary 
and that interests rather than enlightenment drives these changes. The most 
important interests are material (2000:177). According to this theory, class actors 
will support democratisation when there is a perceived material gain to be won 
from democracy. However, it does not give decisive answer as to in what state of 
economic decline or growth different groups will take action. Bellin argues that 
the financial sectors dependence upon state sponsorship and fear for other social 
classes are factors which determine whether they will support democracy or not. 
For the working class, these determinants are state dependence and aristocratic 
position (2000:179). The aristocratic position of the working class refers to how 
privileged their financial situation is vis-à-vis the general population (ibid: 183).      
I interpret Bellin’s theory as firmly rooted in the tradition of rational choice, 
which has been criticised on the basis of being to rigid in its structure and 
deterministic. According to Hugh Ward there are four models of criticism directed 
at rational choice theories. Rational choice fails to accurately explain what acting 
rationally entails. Sociologist emphasise that it does not take into account how 
social structures, discourses and other social norms influence the behaviour and 
action of individuals and groups. The psychological argument is that individuals 
often do not act rationally at all. Political scientist sometimes criticise the 
predictive ambitions of the model and stress that these aspirations are likely to fail 
(2000:72ff). Although I agree with much of this criticism, there are also distinct 
advantages to Bellin’s line of argument. It makes it possible to operationalise 
concepts of political economy. Her ideas about class actors and their dependency 
on the state focus on how different actors strive to gain materially by a process of 
democratisation (2000:180ff). With the earlier criticism in mind, I would like to 
add that these are perceived gains of democracy, and in what manner these issues 
are discussed within social classes is of great importance. One advantage of 
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combining Bellin’s theory with Barins Collier, who stresses that there are many 
paths to democracy, with different actors and arenas of action is a broader 
perspective on the matter of choice. Even though Barins Collier argues that there 
are many paths, she emphasises existing and possible patterns in the actions taken 
(1999:21)   
In order to achieve the purpose of this study I will draw on interviews with 
politicians, scholars and human rights advocates conducted in Nairobi in 
November of 2006. I will consult scholarly articles and other publications about 
the current and historical state of affairs in Kenya.  
I will use Berins Collier’s three dimensions by placing leading politicians in 
this analytical system by looking into the background of a selected number of 
leading politicians in the Kenyan government. If politicians on an individual level 
have connection with the KANU elite or groups, which were favoured by the 
former government these are signs of an elite transition rather than democracy as 
a result of demands from the working class. President Mwai Kibaki, who was 
elected into office in 2002, is of interest here, as are other members’ government. 
I have chosen to look into the backgrounds of President Mwai Kibaki, Internal 
Security Minister John Michuki and Assistant Minister of Finance Peter Kenneth. 
I have chosen these three politicians because they hold significant power; they are 
featured frequently in Kenyan media and are well known. All three have made 
statements to the effect that they favour democracy. I will use the Kenyan 
governments’ website and other reliable sources of information to gain knowledge 
of the political and class background of these politicians. I also conducted an 
interview with Mr. Kenneth in 2006, which will be useful in this regard. 
Surveying all members of government would have advantages, however due to 
limitations in time and space this is not possible. 
Other class actors will, when possible be analysed using similar methods. In 
the independence case and with non-elite actors I will review literature because of 
practical concerns. There is little information about individual working class and 
peasantry actors. 
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2 Conceptualising Social Class in an 
African Context 
In Berins Collier’s analysis social class is not clearly defined. The working class 
is conceptualised as artisans and wage labourers. This inclusive definition of the 
working class is used in order to include pre and post industrialisation societies in 
her study (1999:16). Although she mentions the peasantry, it is not clear if she 
includes this group in the concept of working class actors. Her study is modelled 
to fit the state of affairs in Europe and South America, where the economy is 
industrialised to a large extent; a large section of the population is employed in 
traditional working class professions. 
In this chapter I will attempt to conceptualise social class in a Kenyan 
perspective. This will help develop Berins Collier’s theory to better suit the 
political and economic situation in an African context. With a clear notion of what 
class actors are relevant and an analysis of their significance in the 
democratisation process, understanding what actors were involved in the 
transition and the motivation for their actions is simplified.  
2.1 The Working Class  
Defining the working class in an African setting is problematic and difficult. In 
Kenya 40 % of the population was unemployed in 2001 (www.cia.gov). A large 
percentage is employed or self-employed in the agrarian sector. These facts 
considered there are some inherent problems with defining the working class the 
same way in Africa as in South America and Europe, where Ruth Berins Collier 
conducted her studies. For the definition of the working class to bear any 
significance in this context, it is instrumental that there is an element of power 
inherent to the group. 
According to Alex Thomson, one of the major differences between Europe 
and Africa is the absence of a mass proletariat (2000: 82). The same might be said 
when comparing African states to Latin American states. Although there are some 
examples of unionised workers in Africa, these are few and are generally not mass 
movements. In Thomson’s analysis, the section of the population, which consists 
of skilled labour, is described as an “aristocracy of labour” due to their privileged 
position in relation to the masses of self-sufficient agrarian peasants (ibid:82). 
 Thomson’s analysis of the working class has implications for the use of 
Bellin’s theory of how the aristocratic position of the working class influences 
their collective stance on democracy. According to Bellin working class actors in 
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an aristocratic position often display disolidarity with the masses of un-skilled, 
un-organised labour and self-sufficient farmers (Bellin 2000:183). 
In Berins Collier’s definition, the masses of the working class need not be 
involved in the democratisation process for working class actors to have an 
instrumental role. Individual labourers must not be involved, but there must be a 
sense of class solidarity.  She insist that it is not a matter of a certain percentage of 
the working class being involved in the process, rather how labour unions, 
working class parties and other labour-based organisations have influenced the 
path towards democracy (1999:14f).       
 
2.2 The Peasantry 
According to Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 78 % of the population is 
employed in the informal sector (Kenya Facts and Figures 2006:11). It is self 
explanatory that the majority of these Kenyan citizens are self-sufficient farmers; 
this group is the majority in almost all African states (Thomson 2000: 80). Self 
sufficient farmers are not in possession of the main means of exerting influence of 
labour unions; the general strike, one of the main arenas of action for the working 
class in Berins Colliers model. The political economy is not influenced by the 
peasantry going on strike, as there are no employers. This reduces the possibility 
of the peasantry to wage political protest or partake in the struggle for 
democratisation. The means of mobilisation are reduced to participating in rallies 
or taking up arms. The peasantry protests through avoiding the influence of 
government, rather than influencing the state through democratic institutions. This 
is done through neglecting to pay taxes, informal agreements over land rights and 
other autonomous societal constructs. In return, the state to a large extent does not 
provide political goods1 for the peasantry. Because of these shortcomings by the 
state, Kenya is a weak state and could be heading for failure according to Robert I 
Rotberg: 
 
Although Kenya is intrinsically wealthy, its fortunes have been badly managed, 
corruption is rampant and a gang of ethnically specific thugs has distorted the rule of 
law, limited the supply of political goods, battered civil society and human rights, 
and privileged ethnic minorities against larger, more central, but now marginalized 
ethnicities (2003:17).  
     
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 In Robert I Rotberg’s analysis political goods are claims made by the citizenry on the state. The most important 
political good is security, as the state has a monopoly on legitimate force. Democratic rights are also included in 
the definition. Other political goods include infrastructure, health care, education, currency and fiscal policy and 
a judiciary system (2003:3f).   
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I argue that the weakness of the Kenyan state due to the states inability to 
wield power over and provide political goods for the peasantry stems from the 
peasantries none participation in the financial system, capitalism. Although 
peasants often supplement their income through waged labour in coffee, tea or 
other plantations their income from this is usually a supplement rather than their 
main source of revenue. Thomson argues that this keeps wages in some sectors of 
the labour market low, making it impossible to sustain a liveable income from 
certain professions (2000:80). This non-participation by the majority who are 
peasants, both politically and economically in the systems developed results in 
very little identification with the nation state. Other actors such as ethnic groups, 
NGOs or communities, which do provide political goods for the peasantry, are 
more important for the peasantry than the state. As Karolina Hulterstöm concludes 
in her thesis “In Pursuit of Ethnic Politics” political goods are still being 
distributed along ethnic line rather that according to a needs based analysis 
(2004). This indicates that ethnicity is a stronger identity marker in Kenya than 
nationality.  
According to Thomson, there are very few instances of the peasant class 
mobilising politically in post-colonial Africa (2000: 80f). My analysis of the 
reasons for this is that the stakes involved in political protest are high for the 
peasantry, as taking up arms could result in dire consequences and possibly civil 
war. 
 
2.3  Elite Actors 
In Berins Collier’s theory, elite actors are analysed as one group with a similar 
agenda. There are some differences between political elites in Europe and in 
Africa. First, wealth is accumulated and centred on political leadership to a large 
extent. Wages earned MPs and others in office are high, in many cases higher than 
their European counterparts. Second, trapping from the office are often extensive 
including cars, expense accounts and free education abroad for children (Thomson 
2000:84). Third, corruption is rampant and has according to the Economist not 
decreased since Kibaki’s government took office (Voting out Corruption: 2006). 
This makes the political elite the wealthiest group in Kenyan society. As many 
politicians are also involved in business it can be difficult to differentiate the 
political elite from the financial elite. However, the financial and political elites 
have some significant differences. There is an ethnic dimension to the financial 
sector in Kenya. Many business owners are of Asian decent, a group which is 
represented in parliament but is not often discussed in terms of ethnic politics in 
Kenya (Thomson 2000:85f). Where the political elite are usually land owners, 
who may have invested some of their capital in the industrial sector, the financial 
elite are a social class which has derived from Kenya’s embryonic industrial 
sector. 
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There is also a matter of power and wealth involved in this analysis of elite 
actors. The political and landed elites are often on the receiving and of corruption, 
business men and women are actors who pay bribes to the political elite, making 
them powerful (Thomson 2000:85f). The landed elites do not do so to the same 
extent. The reason for this is that the landed elites are often the same individuals 
who hold political office. The support of landowners is instrumental for 
politicians, as this is a group which holds much informal power in the rural 
communities. Owning substantial amounts of land resources often means 
belonging to a family which has been historically powerful. According to Caroline 
Elkins much of the land left by European settler after independence was sold at 
low cost to those who were loyal to the colonial power or to European investors 
(2005: 362). 
Another aspect is that land is owned in an ethnically homogenous manner. 
Buying and utilizing land in other areas than where ones ethnic group comes from 
is virtually impossible. As Mikewa Ogada of the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission (KHRC) puts it:  
  
I think Kenyans still come from a certain area, they buy land in a certain area; you 
are buried, you have to be buried back in your land. People have an attachment to 
their land, you know. It is unlikely that you will find a Luo2 buying ten acres of land 
in a Luhya area, it would probably not be acceptable to people.   
 
This connection to land does not encourage mobility. Land owners stay in the 
community and are often traditional chiefs, enjoying power and respect in their 
hamlet granting them a unique opportunity to influence for whom the electorate 
votes. Owning land represents security in a country where there is little social 
security and pension systems. Even though an individual may have a career in an 
urban area, selling land means selling this security. If push comes to shove a 
Nairobi professional may always return to their inherited land and make a living 
of it.     
This division of the elite actors of Kenyan society corresponds well with the 
division of non-elites into the working class and the peasantry. The political elite 
and the landed elite are in essence the same people although some persons in the 
financial elite now hold positions in government, while the financial elite is more 
involved with foreign financial interests and investors.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 The Luo are an ethnic group in the Nilotic group, traditionally residing at Lake Victoria in Kenya and 
Tanzania. The Luhya are a Bantus speaking group with origins in the Western Province of Kenya. Mikewa 
Ogada is of Luo origin.  
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2.4  Conclusion: Social Class  
 The division I have made, separating the working class from the peasantry and 
the political and landed elites from financial elites differs from Ruth Berins 
Collier as it has more categories in the analysis. In an African context this is 
necessary, as the role of the working class and financial elites are unlike that of 
those groups in South America and Europe. There is a duality in African society, 
where some sectors like the telecom industry is growing rapidly, while the 
majority of the population is yet dependent on self-sufficient farming.  
In this perspective, grouping working class actors and the peasantry together 
makes little sense. They are groups with separate interests working in different 
sectors of the economy. There is little evidence to suggest that these groups would 
have similar interests in a democratisation process, as their positions in society are 
not connected.       
Likewise, landed and political elites and financial elites do not necessarily 
share the same interests as they are dependent on different policies for their 
prosperity. The financial elites have for a long time been the cash cow for the 
political elite; payment for business licences, bribes and other gratification has 
been characteristics of doing business in many African states. According to 
Thomson this is the reason why the political elites are financial factors of power 
in most African states, while the financial elites are somewhat less powerful and 
wealthy (2000:84f). 
This categorisation of social class draws on Bellin’s findings, as the groups are 
divided according to common material interests. As Bellin puts it:  
 
Interest, not enlightenment drives regime change. […] social forces are most likely 
to champion democracy when their economic interests put them at odds with the 
authoritarian state (2000:177). 
       
It is obvious that the Kenyan working class and peasantry do not share the 
same material interests. Nor do the financial and political elites have common 
interests. Combining Bellin’s and Berins Collier’s theories makes a new 
categorisation of social class necessary. There are also ethnic factors involved in 
what groups may or may not champion democracy in Kenya. Hulterstöms analysis 
has shown that there is an element of ethnic politics in Kenya. Ethnic groups are 
favoured by the government to win political support (2004). It is likely that there 
is a connection between ethnicity and support for the democratic agenda based on 
which groups were favoured by the former government. However, it is difficult to 
deny that social class has implications, which reach beyond ethnicity. Material 
support because of ethnic affiliation is not likely to change because of 
democratisation alone, and the ethnic groups who receive support will most 
probably change depending on who is in office. Social class is a variable which 
cuts across ethnic boundaries making a nationwide analysis possible.     
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3 The Independence Movement and the 
Transition from Colonial Rule 
This chapter deals with the role of the class actors in Kenya’s path to 
independence. The same variables are used when analysing independence as will 
be used in the section on the democratic transition in 2002. The conclusions found 
in this chapter will be compared with the findings in the following chapter in 
order to determine similarities and disparity between the path to independence and 
the democratic transition in 2002. 
3.1 Class actors in the Transition from Colonial Rule 
The peasantry are closely tied to the independence movement in Kenya in the 
1950 ties. The Mau Mau rebellion, which started in 1952 and ended in 1960 can 
be described as an organised peasantry uprising. The grievances expressed by the 
investors of the rebellion were to a large extent connected to land and labour. The 
number of white settlers in Kenya had increased during the post World War years. 
In 1960 just four years before Kenya became an independent state the number of 
white settlers was 63 000 (Anderson 2005: 345). The majority of the settlers lived 
in the Central Highlands or in Nairobi, a region, which was populated by the 
Kikuyu, Embu and Meru ethnic groups. There was little land left for Africans3 to 
utilise and with less labour intensive farming methods, more and more people 
found themselves landless and unemployed (Clayton 1975:1). Local peasant 
populations were forcibly removed from land belonging to white settlers to 
Kikuyu reserves, as more land was now being farmed. The Mau Mau movement 
was formed because of discontent with British rule and landlessness, poor 
working conditions and wages on the farms owned by settlers.  
Most of the persons who were affected by the settler population expanding 
and demanding more land were not employed by the white settlers. They were 
self-sufficient farmers who had been cultivating land formally owned by settlers. 
The Mau Mau movement was effectively put down. The majority of the Kikuyu 
people were detained in British concentration camps or barbed wire villages. Most 
Mau Mau leaders were executed or killed in battle. It is difficult to account for 
how many people were killed by the British colonial forces during the Mau Mau. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 The term”Africans” refers to the population native to Africa. I am aware that there are many African citizens of 
other ethnic decent. 
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A conservative estimate by Caroline Elkins is that 130 000 to 300 000 Kikuyu 
were killed during the insurgence (2005: 366). 
Although the Mau Mau insurgence was put down, it could be argued that 
independence from British rule would not have been possible in 1963 without it. 
Despite the decolonisation of several other African states during the late 1950 ties 
and early 1960 ties, it was far from self-evident that Kenya would follow suite. 
The large number of British settlers in Kenya meant that the situation was 
different than in Ghana or neighbouring Tanzania. According to David Anderson, 
the British had good reason to believe that Kenya would remain under British rule 
for many decades to come when the insurgence began (2005:3f). Another former 
British colony with a large settler community is Zimbabwe, which was not 
decolonised until 1980. A similar development in Kenya without the Mau Mau 
insurgence would not have been unlikely. 
Staying in Kenya after the Mau Mau insurgence would have meant immense 
financial costs and bad publicity in British and European press. Putting down the 
rebellion and killing the instigators made an elite transition in 1963 possible. 
Decolonisation could take place without redistribution of wealth, protecting 
British ownership and production in Kenya. Political power was granted to those 
loyal to the British, ensuring that the structures of power put in place during 
colonialism would remain intact. According to Alex Thomson, those who 
negotiated with the British about the transition from colonialism were mainly 
officials and other elites who were a part of the colonial apparatus. These landed 
elites took over leadership after the decolonisation, not the leaders of the Mau 
Mau insurgence (Thomson 2000:25).  
 Nyinguro and Otenyo argue that the first political parties, which were 
instrumental during the post-independence period, were working class 
organisations. They derived from labour unions and other broad based 
organisations (2007:9f). During colonial rule individuals who were organised in 
trade unions did in a sense belong too an elite. They were clerks, office assistants, 
skilled labourers and postal workers, who were often employed by the colonial 
government in Nairobi and other urban areas. The working class culture 
developed within this group strived to mimic the European way of life, while the 
Mau Mau denounced western religion and social practices. According to David 
Anderson this elite, who called themselves Tai Tai were in conflict with the Mau 
Mau in Nairobi, and were often subjected to brutal punishment as they refused to 
join the insurgence during the 1950ties (2005:190ff). The Tai Tai often informed 
against the Mau Mau in their communities, and it was from its ranks and among 
the Chiefs and Home Guards4 the future leaders of Kenya were recruited as the 
British pulled out of Kenya (Elkins 2005:361).    
The investors and participants of the Mau Mau insurgence mainly belonged to 
the peasantry, although there was some working class involvement in Nairobi and 
other urban centres. Like the Kenyan peasantry today, some of the main 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 The home guard was and armed force consiting of Kikuyu who were opposed to the Mau Mau. they were 
formed by the British colonial power (Anderson 2005:240) 
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grievances were land and liberty. There is no question that the Mau Mau fought 
for the independence of Kenya, or more precisely for freedom from oppression 
and the right to land.  
The reasons for the lack of popular involvement in the decolonisation process 
may be that the Mau Mau insurgence ended in victory for the British; there were 
few representatives of broad based popular movements left alive and even fewer 
who were willing and able to take part in political life. As independence was 
granted just three years after the Mau Mau was put down, new movements 
demanding freedom had not been able to grow and gain momentum.  
 
3.1.1 Analysing the Kenyan Independence with Berins Collier’s and 
Bellin’s Models  
I argue that aristocratic position of the working class during the transition from 
colonial rule to an independent state influenced the groups in favour of 
independence. It may seem curios to describe the position of the working class in 
Kenya prior to independence as aristocratic, given that society was divided along 
ethnic lines, with very few privileges available for Africans. Although standards 
of living, political goods and employment opportunities were scarce for Africans, 
some social and ethnic groups were favoured above others. The British had 
provided education, employment and other political goods for the working class, 
while the peasantry was deprived of most opportunities and services. The 
organised unionised working class lived lives, which were very different from the 
peasant Kikuyu who were part of the Mau Mau. It may seen to be a contradiction 
that the working class would support independence considering this position of 
patronage, given that in Bellin’s analysis the aristocratic position of a social class; 
that they are receiving patronage from the authoritarian regime counteracts 
democratisation (2000:179). However, the British did choose to decolonise Kenya 
given that there was an opportunity to do so on their terms, without the risk of 
loosing all British interest in the region.   
When analysing the material interests of the working class and leaders of 
labour unions and working class based political parties, it is clear that there was 
much to gain from decolonisation. The highest positions in the administration and 
leadership of Kenya prior to independence were held by the British. According to 
J.E Anderson, the working class were generally better educated than the 
peasantry; those employed in skilled labour were usually educated at mission 
school. The educational system was highly segregated, and few Africans had the 
opportunity to achieve even basic education (1965). Considering the lack of 
educated Kenyans, it is fair to assume that the working class, having had the 
privilege of education would be eligible for government positions or other high 
posts in society. This was the making of the political elite. As Thomson explores, 
wealth is often concentrated in the hands of a new political elite, as there is a 
unique opportunity to use the state as a cash cow (2000:83f). There were few 
opportunities for Africans to become truly wealthy, especially for working class 
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actors, as most businesses and land was yet owned by the landed elites who 
gained land though supporting the British during the Mau Mau or the white settler 
community (Elkins 2005:11ff). This fits perfectly with Bellin’s theory when she 
states that “material interests trump all other interests” (2000:177).      
The working class affiliation with the colonial administration meant that they 
were is a position of power and invited to negotiate terms independence. In Berins 
Collier’s model the working class held a position of prior inclusion. They were 
usually employed by the administration or British owned companies. In 1944, 
when the first African member of the Legislative Council5 was elected, the 
representative was a member of the Kenya African Union (KAU) which was a 
union based political party (Anderson 2005:29). The working class or any other 
African actors for that matter could not govern the course of action taken by the 
British government in Kenya. They did however have access to positions in the 
local governing body. This signifies that the working class held a position of prior 
inclusion in the authoritarian regime.  
  Peasantry actors were not directly involved in the process that gave rise to 
independence. The leaders of the Mau Mau were not invited to negotiate, as they 
had been defeated. The arena of action that was available for the peasantry had 
been explored; they had taken up arms against the authoritarian regime and lost. 
The leadership of the peasantry had been lost, they had been eradicated in British 
concentration camps, executed though hanging or were still imprisoned at 
independence (Anderson 2005: 6f, Elkins 2005:149f). The peasantry had not been 
able to mobilise to stage rallies or continue the rebellion and were absent on the 
political arena. Yet, it was the threat of further violence, and consequently a large, 
costly and unpopular British military presence, which deterred the British from 
remaining in Kenya. International pressure, which one could argue could have 
been another important factor in the decision, had not caused Britain to leave 
Zimbabwe6. This suggests that the Mau Mau insurgence was an instrumental 
factor in the decision. As the state grew more authoritarian, the importance of 
peasantry actors declined further, and the political and landed elites merged into 
one as politics was and is a financially lucrative career (Nyinguro and Otenyo 
2007). 
It is not possible to differentiate the financial elite from the landed and 
political elite in the independence process. The economy relied almost solely on 
agrarian produce, and other industries were almost exclusively owned by foreign 
interests (Thomson 2000:6f). The trade sector was dominated by many small 
business owners, rather than elite who could wield power as a result of financial 
wealth.  
Using Berins Collier’s language, the Kenyan transition took place through the 
arena of action of the negotiating table. There was remarkably little public 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 The Legislative council was not a democratically elected assembly. It was dominated by whites until 
independence when it was dissolved. The number of African members in the Legislative Council never 
challenged white supreme rule in Kenya (Anderson 2005:9).   
6 The official name of Zimbabwe was Rhodesia prior to independence in 1980.  
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manifestations of anti-colonial sentiments after the defeat of the Mau Mau 
insurgence. 
 
3.1.2 Land, Democracy and Redress after Independence 
Charles Hornsby and David Throup claim that the period following independence 
was the most democratic period in Kenyan history.  At independence, serious 
attempts at democracy were made and it was arguably the most democratic era to 
date in Kenyan politics. They maintain that the elections in 1961 and 1963 lived 
up to basic democratic criteria and that the intention of the British was for Kenya 
to transition to democratic multi-party rule (1998: 8ff). The argument made here 
is that independence resulted in democracy, and that it was at a later state that 
Kenya reverted back to authoritarian rule.  
I disagree with Hornsby and Throup on several counts. The Mau Mau, who 
were the largest political movement in Kenya prior to independence were banned 
until 2003 (news.bbc.co.uk/b). Although the Mau Mau never developed into a 
political party, the ban on the organisation prevented them from perusing political 
goals. Considering the massive support within the Kikuyu ethnic group for the 
Mau Mau during the insurgence7 it is probable that there would have been an 
opportunity to mobilise around the core issues of the movement, given a 
possibility. Robert Dahl expresses that associational autonomy is a requirement in 
large-scale democracies (2000:85ff). The ban on the Mau Mau is counter to that 
freedom; a fact which is not discussed by Hornsby and Throup. There were other 
imperfections, such as lack of education, making Dahl’s criterion of enlightened 
understanding difficult to live up to. I agree that the multi-party elections in 1961 
and 1963 and the regime of Jomo Kenyatta8 were less authoritarian than the 
regime of Daniel Arap Moi, as discussed by Hornsby and Throup (1998:26). The 
process to end colonialism must be viewed as a transition to independence rather 
than a transition to democracy. 
Those who suffered during the colonial regime were not compensated after 
independence. The British government as well as Kenyan elites did not claim 
responsibility for violations that took place. As the transition to self-determination 
was dominated by elite and working class actors, and those who were subjected to 
the worst occurrences of human rights violations during colonialism primarily 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 It is difficult to estimate how many people considered themselves part of the Mau Mau movement. Caroline 
Elkins estimates that approximately 1 ½ million people were detained during the insurgence (2005:v), it is likely 
that there was a fair number of followers. 
8 Kenyatta was Kenya’s first president and a key individual in Kenya’s independence movement. He was 
imprisoned during the Mau Mau rebellion by the British as they believed him to be a Mau Mau. There was no 
hard evidence to prove this affiliation. In fact Kenyatta preached moderation and co-operation; he fell out with 
Mau Mau leaders during his detention. He negotiated with the British prior to independence and agreed to 
protect British interests (Anderson 2005:63ff). 
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belonged to the peasantry, no efforts were made to rectify the crimes. Many 
individuals in the new political elite were guilty of torture, murder and rape in the 
name of colonialism and had no interest in resolving the underlying conflicts of 
interest between the social classes. There was no material or other interest to 
encourage redress. Jomo Kenyatta preached a policy of forgiveness, rather than 
granting redress for those who suffered. His position was that: “The nation must 
forgive and forget the past” (Kenyatta quoted in Elkins 2005:360). It is not until 
recently that some veterans of the Mau Mau war have brought on a law suit 
against the British government, claiming financial compensation for the suffering 
they endured (bbc.co.uk/a) 
 The land issue was handled in much the same way as the issue of redress. The 
material gains the landed won during colonialism were still in the hands of the 
landed elites. It was though seizing property during the Mau Mau and profitable 
property deals made when many British left Kenya after independence that many 
of those loyal to colonial rule achieved financial wealth (Korwa & Munyae 2001).  
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4 The Democratic Transition in 2002 
In this chapter the role of social class in the democratic transition in 2002 is 
analysed. The importance of the actors in the democratisation process is compared 
to the transition to independence in 1964. Berins Collier’s and Bellin’s theories 
will be used to determine the position, arenas of action and motivation for the 
actions of class actors.  
4.1 The Role of the Political Elite in the 2002 
Transition 
President Mwai Kibaki was the Vice President of Kenya during Daniel Arap 
Moi’s rule from 1978-1988. He was a member of the KANU party from 1963-
1991. In 1992, with the end of single-party rule Kibaki ran for the presidency for 
the first time (statehousekenya.go.ke). He has been supported by former President 
Moi is various ways during his years in office, and is one of Kenya’s wealthiest 
landowners. As Fred Jonyo, a professor of Political Science at Nairobi University 
puts it in an interview: 
  
If you look a Kibaki’s government also, it is a government run by people who have 
property, Moi has property, Kibaki has property, and they are old. So, they are 
united in a class property ownership. So they will not want a system that will disturb 
this. And Moi would feel that it is better for Kibaki to come back again because that 
way they are united in terms of protecting their property. 
 
When analysing the state of affairs in Kenya, it is clear that the landed elites 
hold political power despite the introduction of democratic practices. If 
interpreted according to Barrington Moore’s theory, democracy cannot prevail 
without the existence of a bourgeoisie. He exemplifies this by claiming that 
democracy in the United States would not have been possible without victory for 
the industrialised North over the agrarian South in the Civil War. Likewise, the 
absence of a large bourgeoisie during the French Revolution hindered the path 
towards consolidated democracy through the reactionary influence of the 
peasantry. Eva Bellin refutes Barrington Moore’s theory by drawing on empirical 
data, which does not support the claim that a bourgeoisie is a necessary 
prerequisite for democracy.  Instead, she claims that the relevant factor is which 
groups have an economic interest in democratisation (2000:176). In the Kenyan 
case Barrington Moore’s theory does have some relevance, as the absence of a 
large middle class in Kenya signifies that a large portion of the population is not 
well educated, and as such do not have the necessary tools to utilize the 
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information about the various candidates during the election campaign. In this 
sense, a large portion of the population is unable to gain an enlightened 
understanding of the political issues being debated, which contradicts one of 
Robert Dahl’s demanding criteria for democracy.  
       
 
 
 
Analysing these data, it is obvious that few Kenyans receive a secondary 
degree and even fewer a university education. Considering the high primary 
completion rate and relatively low adult literacy rate, it is fair to assume that it is 
the older generation, which is unable to read. Free primary school education was 
introduced after the 2002 elections, which may have influenced the high number 
of primary school graduates. With a life expectance at just 49 years (World Bank), 
a substantial number of the literate population may well be under 18 years of age 
and not eligible to vote.  
With Fred Jonyo’s statement in mind, there is little doubt that Kibaki in Berins 
Collier’s model would be considered an actor who was included in the elites prior 
to the democratisation process, part of the elite class and had access to the 
negotiating table as an arena of action. 
Likewise, John Michuki Minister for Internal Security has also held various 
positions in the KANU government. However he did not hold office during the 
transition from single to multi-party rule. During this time Michuki was active in 
large scale farming, where he was immensely successful (communication.go.ke). 
In the human rights communitym, the appointment of John Michuki provoked a 
stir. Mikewa Ogada of the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) spoke to 
me of Michuki’s role during the Mau Mau insurgence10:  
 
So the Mau Mau fought for independence but those who were in collaboration with 
the British government are the ones in power today, including the Minister of 
Internal Security, [...] was one of the one who tortured people at that time. [...] many 
people who got the spoils of the war were collaborating with the enemy of the 
Africans. 
 
 Mr. Michuki was a district commissioner in the Muranga district during the late 
colonial era (communication.go.ke). Even though I have not found any evidence to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 Source World Bank http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?CCODE=KEN&PTYPE=CP 
10 The Mau Mau insurgence was and uprising against British colonial rule, which started in 1952 and ended in 
1960. See page 10 
Table 1 9 Education In Kenya   
Primary Completion 
Rate 2005 (%) 
Secondary School 
Enrolment 2005 (%) 
Tertiary School 
Enrolment 2000 (%) 
Literacy Rate (%) 
95 % 48.9 % 2.7 % 73.6 % 
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support the claims that he participated in torture and abuse during the Mau Mau, it 
is a well known fact that the district commissioners and other officials of the 
colonial power gained financial advantages such as land, which had been seized 
from those who were detained. They actively participated in the armed struggle 
against the Mau Mau (Elkins 2005:272f). Even though Mr. Michuki was not active 
in politics during the 1990ties, it is clear that land owners such as Michuki were 
dependant on the former governments’ policy of impunity towards those who 
committed crimes during the colonial era. Bellin’s theory of dependence is relevant 
here, as Michuki and others in his position are class actors in the sense that they 
landowners, and their dependence on the former government signals that they 
would probably not have much to gain from democratisation. According to Bellin 
the two most important variables for capital actors to favour or counteract 
democracy are fear and state dependency (2000:179). In the case of Michuki, there 
is some evidence that democratic reform incited by the working class or the 
peasantry for their material gain could lead to him losing all or part of his 
accumulated wealth. 
Peter Kenneth, Kenya’s Assistant Minister of Finance is considerably younger 
than Michuki and Kibaki, and as such has no incriminating past in the colonial or 
post-colonial regime. During my interview with him, he was careful to point out 
that some of his relatives are Mau Mau war veterans who in his words fought for 
the freedom of Kenya. Mr. Kenneth has however run for office on a local level on a 
KANU ticket during the single-party regime. For most of his career he has been in 
the insurance business, and he has accumulated a fair amount of wealth. During the 
interview Mr. Kenneth said that he is a land owner and has a large cattle farm in his 
constituency Gatanga. He has an elite background yet did not hold political power 
prior to the transition. 
Mr. Kenneth’s appointment to office is a signal that some things have changed 
in the political landscape. He has acquired land like most wealthy Kenyans, yet 
prior to the democratic transition in 2002 he belonged to the financial elite rather 
than the landed political elite. The fact that his relations fought with the Mau Mau, 
rather than on the side of the colonial power indicates that the financial elite are 
gaining political power. It is not only the old landed elites who hold seats in 
parliament. However, Mr. Kenneth was reluctant to criticise the policies and 
governing of the Moi regime: 
   
Even though there were many problems during the Moi era, Moi left Kenya with 
peace and economic development. Other African countries have had much more 
conflicts. However, the legacy of Moi will be the way in which he left. 
 
This disinclination to pass judgement on the preceding regime is connected to 
the fact that Daniel Arap Moi is still an important vessel of power in Kenyan 
politics. Moi has said in an interview in March 2007 that he supports President 
Kibaki, despite being a member of the opposition party KANU 
(africanpress.wordpress.com). As seen earlier, Kibaki and Moi are both part of the 
landed elite and share material interests. Kenneth, who is not a part of this social 
class, has through his position in government gained access to the perks of the 
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political elite. Through owning land, belonging to the current political elite and 
supporting the former regime Mr. Kenneth is in league with the landed elite. This 
may be a sign that the financial elites are gaining political influence, although the 
landed elites still set the agenda.         
The personal history of these three individuals indicates that the Kenya case can 
be categorised as an elite transition. Those in power today were held power during 
the former government as well. Although these actors can be placed in different 
positions I Berins Collier’s model, it is clear that they are elite actors. They 
exemplify the process, which took place in Kenya during the 1990-ties well. 
According to Korwa and Munyae few working class and peasantry actors were 
involved in negotiating for a democratic transition in Kenya. Almost all MPs are 
elite actors who were involved in politics prior to 1992 (2001). 
 
4.2 The Financial Elite 
Not all members of the financial elite are members of political parties or involved 
in political life. Investigating support from the financially powerful for the 
democratisation process is significant because Bellin’s theory of contingent actors 
specifies that support for democracy derives from the incentive for material gain. 
If Kenya’s financial elite support democracy, this is a clear indication that this 
group consider democracy to be beneficial in terms of their economic interests. 
During the 1990ties and early 2000ties, when the Daniel Arap Moi was still in 
power Kenya faced a serious economic downturn. Corruption was rampant, 
foreign investment decreasing and inflation reached 100 % in 1993. According to 
the US Department of State, this was to a large extent due to government 
mismanagement of the economy (www.state.gov). As we have seen earlier, 
capital in Kenya is to a large extent dependant on government policy, as the 
landed and political elites finance their wealth through the financial sector. 
According to Bellin’s capital state dependency is usually detrimental for capital 
support for democracy. In the Korean case she describes, changes in international 
arena, coupled with changes in the character of state sponsorship resulted in new 
found enthusiasm in the financial sector for democratic reform (2000:189). 
Likewise, the Kenyan transition took place in an era of economic change and 
expected alterations in the financial sector due to globalisation, both domestically 
and internationally. With the end of the Cold War, pressure on Kenya and many 
other states to reform their financial sectors was mounting. With some sectors in 
the Kenyan economy dependant on foreign aid, which to an increasing extent 
came with demands for democratic reform maintaining government sponsorship 
seemed ever less likely. Fear of losing the support of the government paired with 
the development towards democracy in other African states changed the agenda of 
financial elites in Kenya, and a shift where these elites supported reform took 
place. 
  20
An example of how business executives in Kenya have been supportive of 
democracy is Mr. Vimal Shah, who is one of Kenya’s wealthiest businessmen, 
and owner of Bidco, an oil-services company. In an interview with Thomas L. 
Freidman, a writer at the New York Times he said about the recent democratic 
reforms "even if the government changes, it won’t change the rules. The 
politicians can’t stop this." (www.dispatch.com) He believes that the governments 
more democratic and transparent rules are good for business. Mr. Shah has to a 
large extent been right, since 2002 the economy has recovered significantly. It is 
difficult to determine whether this improvement is dependant on the democratic 
reforms or if there are other causes. However, Mr. Shah’s enthusiasm exemplifies 
the Kenyan financial elite’s positive attitudes towards the democratic project. 
Bratton and van de Walle identify the reasons for the financial sectors support 
for democracy as dependent on dissatisfaction with the share of the states 
resources they could obtain during authoritarian rule. They confirm the business 
elite’s support for the democratic project in the Kenyan case (1997:167). This 
coheres with Bellin’s theory that the perceived advantages of democracy must 
outweigh the fear of the consequences of working class and peasantry political 
influence for elites to support democracy. The landed elites were in control of the 
democratisation process and the financial elites supported the opposition parties, 
hoping to improve their position in the coming regime. 
Analysing the role of these financial elite in the democratisation process using 
Berins Collier’s model poses some difficulty. They were not directly involved in 
negotiating the transition from single to multi party rule they would be 
characterised as outsiders in the process, which is not completely in line with the 
events that took place. The support of business elites was important for 
democratisation, not least because of the pressure exercised by foreign investors, 
INGOs and donor states. The economic elite had a unique position in gaining 
international support for democracy because of the globalised nature of the 
financial world. As David Held argues, nation states are finding it increasingly 
difficult to wield power over the financial sector, as power over capital is 
becoming increasingly globalised (2000:20). In the Kenyan case international 
pressure for democracy is an important aspect of the transition.  
In Bratton and van de Walle’s analysis the importance of the financial elites 
support for democracy lies mainly in their willingness to fund oppositional 
parties. They state that the two sources of funding available to oppositional groups 
are citizens living abroad and local business (1997:167f). In the Kenyan case, 
where oppositional parties have been officially permitted since the 1992 elections, 
fragmentisation,  unfair elections and abuse by the authorities prevented the 
opposition from gaining ground such funding has been essential (Korwa & 
Munyae 2001). The political and landed elites joined oppositional parties once the 
terms of the transition had been negotiated.   
The role of the financial elite and the arena of action as a financier of the 
opposition is not explicitly analysed by Berins Collier. As explored earlier in this 
chapter, the opposition which won the 2002 elections were a part of the political 
and landed elites prior to the transition. Financing the opposition, whose arena of 
action was the negotiating table and who enjoyed a position of inclusion in the 
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former regime, the financial elite must to some extent be said to share that 
position. 
In my view, the financial sector has played a unique role in the 
democratisation process. Their ability to be “insiders” through financing the 
opposition as well as “outsiders”, in their own arena of action with a possibility to 
influence international key actors is not explored by Berins Collier. The actions of 
large and medium sized companies influence the course of action taken by policy 
makers and politicians to a large extent, in some cases perhaps more so than 
political protests and rallies. Without international and national investments it is 
difficult for the economy to grow and prosper. Companies will not invest where 
the stakes are high and the possibility of profits low. There is a symbiotic 
relationship between politics and finance, where both adjust to meet the needs of 
the other.             
4.3 The Working Class and Peasantry the Democratic 
Transition   
Working class actors and the peasantry were hardly involved in the current 
democratic transition at all. Nyinguro & Otenyo argue that they had some 
importance in the 1990ties when pro-democratic rallies were common. Most 
notably the Saba Saba11 riots on the 7 of July 1990 in all of Kenya’s major cities 
were key signs that working class actors were involved in democratisation 
(2007:13). The protests were easily struck down, and there was never a possibility 
that working class protests alone would topple the authoritarian regime (ibid: 14). 
I argue that the Saba Saba riots where an indication that democratisation was on 
the way rather than actions that contributed to the process; international pressure 
on domestic elites after the end of the Cold War was growing stronger and 
authoritarian rule was rapidly becoming a less viable option as other African 
states in the region were adopting multi-party practices. 
 Jeffrey Herbst claims that the end of the Cold War reduced the political 
importance of most African states on the international stage. As there was no 
longer as much of a political struggle between the East and the West in the UN 
and on other arenas, the support of African states was no longer necessary 
(2000:108ff). This resulted in decreased international support and aid for African 
states. Consequently, support for African regimes became conditional of 
democratic reform as democratic ideals became hegemonic with the fall of 
communism (Thomson 2000:150ff).  This does not diminish the bravery and 
conviction of those who participated in the riots, there were simply no large 
unions or other organisations involved with enough political power to influence 
the political situation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 ”Saba Saba” means” seven seven” in English, and refers to the date on which the riots took place.    
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During the rule of Daniel Arap Moi working class organisations and labour 
unions were all but eradicated. Leaders were imprisoned and tortured, and many 
organisations outlawed (Korwa & Munyae: 2001). Consequently, working class 
actors, which had played a role in the path towards independence no longer played 
an important part in political life. In Thomson’s analysis of the causes of this 
exclusion of the working class he explores the different types of authoritarian 
single-party rule in Africa. He categorises Kenya as a State Capitalist regime, 
while Zambia and Tanzania are described as African Socialist regimes prior to 
democratisation. The  signification is that the African Socialist states often had 
mandatory membership in labour unions for skilled labour, whereas State 
Capitalist regimes favoured capital over the workforce, and strived to outlaw 
labour unions in order to provide cheap labour for landed and financial elites 
(2000:42ff).    
In perusing further answers to why this is the case in Kenya investigating the 
political economy is necessary, as working class actors are connected to the 
labour market. As touched upon earlier, there is no large industrialised sector in 
the Kenyan economy. The agrarian sector is by far the largest in the Kenyan 
economy (www.cia.gov). As farming methods are changing industrialised farming 
such as the coffee and tea industries grew less labour intensive in the 1960ties, 
that potential platform for organised labour was all but eradicated.  
Even though there were serious cases of favouritism and mismanagement in 
the Kenyan state the potential cost of armed struggle was too high for the majority 
of peasantry actors to take up arms. According to Korwa and Munyae, there were 
outbursts of violence during the 1992 and 1997 elections in areas were there were 
strong anti-KANU sentiments. These uprisings were violently put down by Moi’s 
government; several peasant leaders were detained and tortured, political 
organisations were declared illegal (2001).       
When surveying the existence of organised working class and peasantry actors 
today and during the 1990ties, there is little evidence to show that the working 
class is organised in large, powerful organisations. Rather there is a patchwork of 
NGOs, women’s movements and pressure groups with little or no common 
agenda. In some cases, these organisations are based on ethnic sentiments rather 
than on common politic goals or issues. As Mikewa Ogada of the KHRC put it: 
 
The leadership and membership of many NGOs is often ethnically homogenous, 
even though the names might not indicate an ethnic interest. That’s a sign that they 
will pursue those interests rather than other issues. 
   
Historically political parties have provided the basis for mass involvement in 
political processes in some states. Berins Collier exemplifies labour based parties 
in The Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, where political parties have been a 
vessel for mass mobilisation in democratisation processes (1999: passim).  These 
need not be connected to mobilisation through labour unions. The Kenyan 
political parties are not broad based and centred on issues or ideologies in the way 
that Berins Collier’s examples illustrate. When surveying the political parties in 
Kenya, it is clear that none, with the possible exception of KANU the former 
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ruling party has a broad based membership.  Peter Kenneth, Assistant minister of 
finance was not sure about what party he would run for in the upcoming elections 
in December 2007 when I interviewed him in November 2006. He explained that 
political parties have very little significance in the Kenyan democratic system; the 
electorate seems more interested in the candidate himself12, his ethnicity and what 
he represents. Issues such as what the candidate’s position is on the constitution or 
other policies are, according to Kenneth, of secondary importance to voters. Mr. 
Kenneth spends several days a week in his constituency meeting with his 
electorate. The issues most wish to discuss with him do not concern government 
policy. He is prompted to financially support individual children from under 
privileged families though school, or donate money towards health care for those 
who cannot afford to pay for these services on their own. 
 
The most common complaint is about healthcare. They come to me when they or 
someone they know is sick, asking for financial help. Some come to me asking for 
me to support their children’s education. 
 
So no one speaks to you about the new constitution, or other issues they want you to 
press? 
 
No, they are not interested in issues; it is a matter of putting food on the table, 
getting healthcare and education. We need to separate the institutions from the MPs 
if we want to change this. 
  
The lack of public interest in issues was a recurring theme in my interviews 
with Kenyan politicians, human rights advocates and scholars. There was 
consensus that ethnicity was more important for the electorate than policies. 
These are signs that Kenya is a patron-client state, where politicians are 
viewed as patrons of the communities, rather than leader to represent the 
electorate in a wider sense of national politics. A good patron provides the 
community with political goods on a person to person basis, rather than improving 
the over all situation for all. There is also an element of ethnic politics inherent to 
this system. The patron is expected to represent the community and to share 
cultural values and set the moral standard. 
There is a long history of patron-clientalism in Kenyan society. The role of the 
MP is similar to that of the Chiefs that were instated by the British colonial power. 
The Chief would in an arbitrary manner decide who would receive support from 
the authorities. There is also a paternalistic element to this state of affairs; no 
demand is made on the citizens to truly understand what political issues are being 
debated in parliament or insist upon influencing politics (Hulterström 2004:92ff). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 candidates for office are most often male in Kenya. As of 2006, the percentage of female MPs was just 7 % 
(unhabitat.org). 
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The patron-client state is relevant to this study because there are ramifications 
as to how political mobilisation takes place. Bratton and van de Walle explore the 
role of political parties in African states during the transitions of the 1990 ties: 
 
[...] political parties were little more than collections of notables held together by 
clientalism and the promise of access to state resources[...]Parties were 
differentiated less by ideological or programmatic concerns than by the narrow 
interests of clientelist networks, typically organized around an individual(1997:251).  
 
Furthermore Bratton and van de Walle discuss the role of clientalist networks 
in African politics, and note that the same individuals or relations to those that 
were active in politics in the years following independence are leading figures in 
the newly formed political parties in states, which have recently transitioned to 
democracy. More often than not the elites in the newly formed parties have held 
high political posts during single-party rule (ibid: 250ff). In the Kenyan case the 
2002 presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta13 is the son of Jomo Kenyatta, 
another leading figure is Raila Odinga, son of the notable Chief and independence 
activist Odinga Odinga. 
There are few organisations, unions and political parties in Kenya, which 
facilitate the peasantries and working class actor’s involvement in politics. There 
are several reasons for this state of affairs; clientalism does not favour mass 
involvement as political issues are not on the agenda. The policies of the former 
regime did not allow for the development of broad based organisations for the 
non-elites. The political economy of Kenya, with many self-sufficient farmers and 
few places of work with large numbers of employees does not favour joint class 
action. The lack of co-operation between NGOs because of ethnic sentiments 
hinders common political campaigns.     
4.4  Conclusion: The 2002 Democratic Transition 
The democratic transition in 2002 was an elite dominated transition; even more so 
than during the transition from colonial rule to independence. The aristocratic 
position held by the working class in the independence movement had declined 
significantly in 2002, as many working class organisations were outlawed during 
the rule of Daniel Arap Moi. In Bellin’s analysis, this loss of position and 
oppression by the authoritarian regime would push the working class to support 
democratisation. Focusing on the material interests of the working class, there 
seems to have been much to gain by advocating democracy for the group as they 
were not receiving patronage under Moi. Signs of support for democratisation 
were seen during the Saba Saba riots in 1997; however the lack of organisations 
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and unions diminished the importance of their actions. Because of these 
shortcomings in that respect they could not exercise power over the labour 
market. Joint action in the form of a general strike would have been exceedingly 
difficult to organise.    
As working class actors did not hold a position of prior inclusion in the former 
regime they were not invited to negotiate a transition, the arena of action open to 
them was the public space through public protest. Few representatives of broad 
based social movements hold formal politic power today. Wangari Maathai is an 
exception to the rule as she is a representative of a social movement and an MP. 
The position of the peasantry had not changed since independence. In Berins 
Collier’s model they are actors with no prior inclusion in the former regime with 
no access to the negotiating table. The political oppression, landlessness and 
deprivation of political goods resulted in the peasantry supporting 
democratisation, albeit they had few opportunities to express those sentiments. 
The difference in the actions taken by the peasantry during the democratic 
transition and the path to independence is the level of violence and when the 
violence took place. In the independence process the elite chose to liberate Kenya 
after defeating the Mau Mau insurgence when the peasantry was in a weak 
position and could not mobilise violent protest. In the years leading up to the 2002 
transition minor violent uprisings incited by the peasantry took place. However, 
the violent struggle of the peasantry had not yet reached a level where the 
integrity of the authoritarian regime was threatened. In both cases the elites chose 
to initiate processes aimed at transition at a point in time when peasant actors 
were relatively weak; in the case of independence after a major rebellion was put 
and during the democratic transition before they had a major uprising to deal with. 
The strategy by the landed and political elite to promote democracy when the 
peasantry have not mobilised into armed struggle signifies that there is an element 
of fear involved. In Bellin’s theory fear is one of the main motivations for elite 
actors to support democracy (2000:72ff). In this case, the fear of what may 
happen if the peasantry mobilises further may be a driving force.     
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5 A Culture of Impunity 
In this chapter the actions taken by the Kenyan government after the democratic 
transition in 2002 are discussed and analysed. The issues of interest are land 
reform and redress. The policy of the Kenyan government on these issues have to 
my knowledge not yet been discussed in academic articles or other literature. This 
chapter of the paper relies on interviews with well-informed individuals.       
5.1 Land Reform 
Prior to the elections in 2002, Mwai Kibaki promised an overview of the improper 
ways in which land was distributed during the Moi regime. Mikewa Ogada 
discussed the issue of land reform with me:  
 
Land is a very delicate issue in this country. Kibaki said before coming to power that 
there was to be established a commission. The role of this commission was to look 
though, to review all land that could be suspected to have been irregularly or 
illegally allocated to people. And they have counted to 200 000 different plot 
numbers in the country which the government has just given away or distributed, 
government land! Both private and public land has been investigated. They have 
given away land in the road reserves, that’s why we can’t expand our roads. All that 
has been investigated and that report  took 2 years to do.[...] I do not think that we 
will be able to practically address the land problem as far back as the 1950s. I would 
be very difficult. But from 1963 onwards in the independent Kenya. 
   
Ogada expresses that the political and landed elites have seen land as one of 
the resources they could utilise as a privilege of there position in government or as 
pay offs to gain support from local notables. Considering that the same 
individuals are in government today as prior to the transition, it is likely that some 
of the land distributed in an arbitrary manner is owned by those in power today. In 
Bellin’s theory, where material interests trump all others land reform under such 
circumstances is an unlikely event. 
Maina Kiai is head of Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
(KNHRC)14, which reviewed the land irregularities discussed by Mikewa Ogada. 
He does not believe that much will come of the commissions report: 
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  27
 
We have to look 40-50 years down to line, we are 33 million people, only on third of 
our land is arable, we have 1 % forest cover of our land, we need 30 %, we don’t 
have enough land to have everybody as a farmer with a piece of land. […] The 
issues of land reform must be addressed, and people compensated. It will never 
happen with these people in power. 
  
As of yet, nothing has come of the governments promise to address the issue 
of land reform. I have followed the promises made by politicians in the election 
campaign leading up to the elections in December 2007 in Kenya’s leading 
newspaper the Nation, and no mention has been made by any candidate about the 
issue.   
 
5.2 Redress 
When analysing the possibility of redress from Bellin’s perspective, it seems 
unlikely that those who committed crimes during the Moi regime will be brought 
to justice and those who suffered compensated. With persons like John Michuki in 
government who would have a lot to lose by such a process, the opportunities 
seem slim for such a development. Maina Kiai describes his experience with 
handling the issue: 
 
If it is in their interest today to talk about transitional justice they will, whether they 
are in KANU, or they are in government. If it is not, they won’t. I mean, this 
country, this government they assured us, I sat own with Kibaki, and he said, yes we 
will do a truth commission, he would. He didn’t, eventually he brought people into 
government who have too much to lose. So we have not solved the problem. 
 
There has been progress in the area of human rights in Kenya. The 
establishment of the KNHRC, which is funded by the state, is a step in the 
direction of respect for human rights. Different media channels regularly run 
stories about corruption in the political elite, which would not have been possible 
prior to the 2002 elections. Above all the torture chambers have closed. There are 
still some major issues that have not been dealt with. These steps forward do not 
mean that Kenya has made peace with its past during the authoritarian regime. As 
Kiai expresses; too many people have too much to lose. The victims have no yet 
been granted redress, and the government is not taking steps in that direction.   
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6 Conclusion 
As the Kenyan transition to democracy was essentially an elite transition, where 
the key actors were insiders in the authoritarian regime it is not surprising that 
land reform and redress for victims of torture has not taken place. What is 
surprising is that the issues have been discussed by politicians with human rights 
advocates despite the possible losses the political and landed elites may suffer if 
land reform takes place and a truth commission instated. When analysing the issue 
using Bellin it seems unlikely that the Kenyan government will take action in the 
way of land reform and redress. 
The path towards independence was also an elite transition, where the elites 
were insiders in the colonial regime. The involvement of the working class was an 
important aspect, although they had closer affiliations with elite actors than the 
peasantry. The social class that suffered the most during colonial was the 
peasantry; they were the ones who lost their land, were subjected to forced 
repatriation, and were tortured and died in British concentration camps. The 
working class were not advocates for the material or other needs of the peasantry.   
As seem earlier, no attempts were made by the Kenyatta or Moi regimes to 
grant redress for the victims of the British concentration camps during the Mau 
Mau or other colonial violence. No land reform took place. As the Mau Mau 
remained an illegal organisation until 2003, the issue was not even discussed in 
public political life. According to Elkins, the history of the Mau Mau was not 
taught in Kenyan schools (2005:367). 
How the issues of land and redress were handled by the Kenyan government 
in these two cases is remarkably similar; in both cases nothing was done as the 
political and landed elites had too much to lose by taking action. The difference is 
that the issue is discussed by the educated elite in the current political landscape in 
Kenya. This may be a sign that matter may be addressed during the next term of 
office, depending on which officials are elected. 
In all essence my hypothesis that the elite transitions in Kenya would not 
result in land reform or redress was correct. However, more substantial evidence 
is needed to prove that the nature of democratic transition influences the policies 
adopted by governments. In order to prove this correlation, more studies need to 
be carried out. In an African context, the type of authoritarian regime present prior 
democratic transition may be an essential variable. Kenya was a State Capitalist 
state, while Zambia and Tanzania were African Socialist regimes. Categorising 
African states according to regime type, and carrying out a similar study on a 
larger scale would provide more decisive answers to whether the actions and 
position of class actors influences land reform and redress.        
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6.1 Developing the Theories 
The contribution made in this essay with regard to developing Berins Collier’s 
theory is changing the categorisation of social class to better suit the African 
context. This study has shown that the peasantry and the working class do not 
share the same interests, and are in fact separate class actors in these 
circumstances. 
In the independence movement working class actors were closer related to the 
elite actors in terms of their arena of action and prior inclusion than to the 
peasantry. In the democratic transition the working class no longer shared the 
same arena of action as elite actors, nor were they insiders in the Moi regime. For 
the peasantry, the arena of action and prior exclusion has remained the same. This 
is significant, as it shows that the peasantry and the working class are separate 
social classes that do not necessarily share the same interests or other 
characteristics. 
The same can be said about the political elite and the financial elite. The 
financial elite was of virtually no importance in the transition from colonial rule, 
while they played a vital role in the democratic transition in 2002. In both cases, 
the financial elite was excluded in the former regime, and the political and landed 
elite enjoyed a position of inclusion. Analysing the financial elite separately also 
widened the scope of what the possible arenas of action for political mobilisation 
are. The financial sectors role in democratisation could be an interesting field of 
study. 
Combining Bellin and Berins Collier has added the motivation of the actors as 
a variable. Why the actors behave the way they do is of interest because this 
allows for the study of material interests. Berins Collier’s theory restricts the field 
of research to how questions, while Bellin’s theory also allows for why questions. 
“Why” is necessary when investigating the distribution policy and possibility of 
redress. I would not have been able to reach these results without it.  
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7.1 List of Abbreviations 
KAU- Kenya African Union 
KANU- Kenyan African National Union 
KHRC- Kenya Human Rights Commission 
K-DOP-Kenya National Observation Committee 
KNCHR- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
NARC- National Rainbow Coalition 
ODM- Orange Democratic Movement 
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